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Civics Practice Test (English) Tarjetas de Educación Cívica para el Examen de Naturalización (Tarjetas de Educación Cívica para el Examen de Naturalización) 100 Civics Questions and Answers (Spanish) (DOCX, 104.84 KB) 100 Preguntas y Respuestas de Educación Cívica Preparing for the Naturalization Test: A Pocket Study Guide (Spanish) Civics Practice Test (Spanish) Reading & Writing Test Writing Vocabulary Flash Cards for the Naturalization Test (PDF, 1014.08 KB) Easy-to-use flash cards containing vocabulary words to help study for the English writing portion of the naturalization test. Reading Test Vocabulary List for the Naturalization Test (PDF, 184.75 KB) Official list of vocabulary for the English reading portion of the naturalization test. Writing Test Vocabulary List for the Naturalization Test (PDF, 181.5 KB) Official list of vocabulary for the English writing portion of the naturalization test. Reading Test Vocabulary List for the Naturalization Test (large print) (PDF, 130.53 KB) Official list of vocabulary for the English reading portion of the naturalization test. Writing Test Vocabulary List for the Naturalization Test (large print) (PDF, 126.91 KB) Official list of vocabulary for the English writing portion of the naturalization test. Vocabulary for the Naturalization Interview: Self-Test 1 This reading activity has words and phrases that you may read on the Application for Naturalization, Form N-400, or hear during the naturalization interview. Teacher Guide (PDF, 130.88 KB) Vocabulary for the Naturalization Interview: Self-Test 2 This reading and listening activity has words and phrases that you may read on the Application for Naturalization, Form N-400, or hear during the naturalization interview. Teacher Guide (PDF, 133.38 KB)
AGGRAVATED FELONIES BIA CASE LAW Accessory After the Fact Matter of Batista, 21 I&N Dec. 955 (BIA 1997) (1) The offense of accessory after the fact to a drug-trafficking crime, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3 (Supp. V 1993), is not considered an inchoate crime and is not sufficiently related to a controlled substance violation to support a finding of deportability pursuant to section 241(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(B)(i) (1994). (2) The respondent’s conviction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3 establishes his deportability as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony under section 241(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act,because the offense of accessory after the fact falls within the definition of an obstruction of justice crime under section 101(a)(43)(S) of the Act, 8 U.S.C.A. §1101(a)(43)(S) (West Supp. 1997), and because the respondent’s sentence, regardless of any suspension of the imposition or execution of that sentence, “is at least one year.” Alien Smuggling Matter of Alvarado-Alvino, 22 I&N Dec. 718 (BIA 1999) An alien convicted of an offense described in section 275(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (Supp. II 1996), is not convicted of an aggravated felony as that term is defined in section 101(a)(43)(N) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(N) (Supp. II 1996), which specifically refers to those offenses relating to alien smuggling described in sections 274(a)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act, 8U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A) and (2) (Supp. II 1996). Arson Matter of Bautista, 25 I&N Dec. 616 (BIA 2011) Attempted arson in the third degree in violation of sections 110 and 150.10 of the New York Penal Law is an aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(E)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(E)(i) (2006), even though the State crime lacks the jurisdictional element in the applicable Federal arson offense. Matter of Vasquez-Muniz, 23 I&N Dec. 207 (BIA 2002), followed. Matter of Palacios, 22 I&N Dec. 434 (BIA 1998) An alien who was convicted of arson in the first degree under the law of Alaska and sentenced to 7 years’ imprisonment with 3 years suspended was convicted of a “crime of violence” within the meaning of section 101(a)(43)(F) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8U.S.C. §1101(a)(43)(F) (Supp. II 1996), and therefore is deportable under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (Supp. II 1996), as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony. Burglary Matter of Perez, 22 I&N Dec. 1325 (BIA 2000) (Burglary of a Vehicle) The offense of burglary of a vehicle in violation of section 30.04(a) of the Texas Penal Code Annotated is not a “burglary offense” within the definition of an aggravated felony in section 101(a)(43)(G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43)(G) (Supp. IV 1998). Commercial Bribery Matter of Gruenangerl, 25 I&N Dec. 351 (BIA 2010) The crime of bribery of a public official in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)(A) (2006) is not an offense “relating to” commercial bribery and is therefore not an aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(R) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R) (2006). Conspiracy Matter of Richardson, 25 I&N Dec. 226 (BIA 2010) (1) The term “conspiracy” in section 101(a)(43)(U) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(U) (2006), is not limited to conspiracies that require the commission of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy by one of the conspirators. (2) An alien who was only convicted of conspiracy to commit an aggravated felony and is removable on the basis of that conviction under section 101(a)(43)(U) of the Act may not also be found removable for the underlying substantive offense, even though the record of conviction shows that the conspirators actually committed the substantive offense. Controlled Substances Matter of Ferreira, 26 I&N Dec. 415 (BIA 2014) Where a State statute on its face covers a controlled substance not included in the Federal controlled substances schedules, there must be a realistic probability that the State would prosecute conduct under the statute that falls outside the generic definition of the removable offense to defeat a charge of removability under the categorical approach. Matter of L-G-H-, 26 I&N Dec. 365 (BIA 2014) Sale of a controlled substance in violation of section 893.13(1)(a)(1) of the Florida Statutes, which lacks a mens rea element with respect to the illicit nature of the substance but requires knowledge of its presence and includes an affirmative defense for ignorance of its unlawful nature, is an “illicit trafficking” aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (2012). Matter of Flores, 26 I&N Dec. 155 (BIA 2013) The offense of traveling in interstate commerce with the intent to distribute the proceeds of an unlawful drug enterprise in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(1)(A) (2006) is not an “aggravated felony” under section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (2006), because it is neither a “drug trafficking crime” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006) nor “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance.” Matter of Davis, 20 I&N Dec. 536 (BIA 1992), followed. Matter of Castro-Rodriguez, 25 I&N Dec. 698 (BIA 2012) An alien convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute under State law has the burden to show that the offense is not an aggravated felony because it involved a “small amount of marihuana for no remuneration” within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(4) (2006), which the alien may establish by presenting evidence outside of the record of conviction. Matter of Aruna, 24 I&N Dec. 452 (BIA 2008), clarified. Matter of Sanchez-Cornejo, 25 I&N Dec. 273 (BIA 2010) The offense of delivery of a simulated controlled substance in violation of Texas law is not an aggravated felony, as defined by section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (2006), but it is a violation of a law relating to a controlled substance under former section 241(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(B)(i) (1994). Matter of Aruna, 24 I&N Dec. 452 (BIA 2008) Absent
Arriving Alien BIA Cases Matter of Gonzalez Romo, 26 I&N Dec. 743 (BIA 2016) Within the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, a returning lawful permanent resident who has a felony conviction for solicitation to possess marijuana for sale is inadmissible under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2012), even though that section refers only to attempt and conspiracy to commit a crime involving moral turpitude, and is therefore properly considered to be an arriving alien under section 101(a)(13)(C)(v) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) (2012). Matter of Vo, 25 I&N Dec. 426 (BIA 2011), clarified. Matter of E-R-M- & L-R-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 520 (BIA 2011) (1) Section 235(b)(1)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (2006), does not limit the prosecutorial discretion of the Department of Homeland Security to place arriving aliens in removal proceedings under section 240 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2006). (2) The fact that an Immigration Judge has no jurisdiction over applications for adjustment of status under the Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act of November 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161, as amended, does not negate his or her jurisdiction over the removal proceedings of arriving Cuban aliens under section 240 of the Act. Matter of Oseiwusu, 22 I&N Dec. 19 (BIA 1998) (1) An alien who arrives in the United States pursuant to a grant of advance parole is an “arriving alien,” as that term is defined in the federal regulations. (2) According to the regulations, an Immigration Judge has no authority over the apprehension, custody, and detention of arriving aliens and is therefore without authority to consider the bond request of an alien returning pursuant to a grant of advance parole. Matter of R-D-, 24 I&N Dec. 221 (BIA 2007) (1) An alien who leaves the United States and is admitted to Canada to seek refugee status has made a departure from the United States. (2) An alien returning to the United States after the denial of an application for refugee status in Canada is seeking admission into the United States and is therefore an arriving alien under 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(q) (2007).
BIA CASE LAW REGARDING ADMISSIONS Matter of Chavez-Alvarez, 26 I&N Dec. 274 (BIA 2014) (1) Adjustment of status constitutes an “admission” for purposes of determining an alien’s removability under section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012), as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony “at any time after admission.” Matter of Rosas, 22 I&N Dec. 616 (BIA 1999), reaffirmed. (2) An element listed in a specification in the Manual for Courts-Martial (“MCM”), which must be pled and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, is the functional equivalent of an “element” of a criminal offense for immigration purposes. (3) The crime of sodomy by force in violation of article 125 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 925 (2000), and the Punitive Articles of the MCM relating to sodomy, is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2012) within the definition of an aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(F) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F)(2012). Matter of Koljenovic, 25 I&N Dec. 219 (BIA 2010) An alien who entered the United States without inspection and later obtained lawful permanent resident status through adjustment of status has “previously been admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence” and must therefore satisfy the 7-year continuous residence requirement of section 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2006), to be eligible for a waiver of inadmissibility. Matter of Quilantan, 25 I&N Dec. 285 (BIA 2010) For purposes of establishing eligibility for adjustment of status under section 245(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2006), an alien seeking to show that he or she has been “admitted” to the United States pursuant to section 101(a)(13)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (2006), need only prove procedural regularity in his or her entry, which does not require the alien to be questioned by immigration authorities or be admitted in a particular status. Matter of Areguillin, 17 I&N Dec. 308 (BIA 1980), reaffirmed.
Sponsor’s Household Size 150% of HHS Poverty Guidelines* 1 $22,590 2 $30,660 3 $38,730 4 $46,800 5 $54,870 6 $62,940 7 $71,010 8 $79,080 Add $8,070 for each additional person source: https://www.uscis.gov/i-912p
A Notice to Appear (“NTA”) initiates removal proceedings by informing the immigrant respondent that they must appear in Immigration Court on a specific day to answer to a charge of removeability. An NTA is issued as a standard DHS form, Form I-862. The statutory requirements of an NTA can be found at INA § 239 & 8 USC § 1229 as well as the regulatory requirements at 8 CFR §§ 1229 and 1239.1. Every NTA should include the respondent’s identifying information,4 the nature of the proceedings, the charges of removability and supporting factual allegations, the date and place of removal proceedings, advisals of certain rights and responsibilities, and a certificate of service. The statute and regulations require DHS to include all this information in the NTA. The NTA will specify the nature of the proceedings in a series of three check boxes under the Respondent’s name and address. The NTA will inform the individual if they are being charged as an “arriving alien,” an individual present in the United States without having been admitted or paroled, or someone who was admitted but is removable for the reasons stated. In support of the charges of removability, DHS should also include on the NTA a list of factual allegations that establish the respondent’s alienage (their country of birth or nationality) and other facts that support the charges of removal. DHS sometimes uses information provided by the respondent in prior applications filed for immigration benefits or statements made to CBP, ICE, or USCIS officers. However, it is not uncommon for the NTA to allege erroneous or incomplete facts in a respondent’s case based on inaccurate or incomplete information provided by DHS databases or officers. Finally, the NTA also contains a number of warnings and advisals to the respondent about their rights and responsibilities while in removal proceedings, such as the right to obtain counsel, the responsibility to inform the government of any change of address, and the consequences of failing to provide a change of address or failing to appear for a scheduled hearing.
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) The INA is a main source of immigration law in the United States. It contains many of the most important provisions of law relevant to immigration proceedings. Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Title 8 of the CFR codifies the INA and includes regulations followed by the Department of Homeland Security and EOIR. The regulations cover practice and procedure in immigration proceedings. Other Resources for Research Country Condition Pages BIA Precedential Decision By Topic Headings EOIR Operational Status Immigration Court Operational Status Submit A Question
STEP 1 Identify the “Generic” Definition of the Removal Ground The grounds of inadmissibility and deportability (which include the definition of an aggravated felony) contain dozens of terms describing crimes, e.g., “crime involving moral turpitude,” “crime of child abuse,” “law…relating to a controlled substance,” “crime of violence,” “burglary,” etc. Each of these terms must have a technical, federal definition, referred to as the “generic” definition. Our first research task is to identify the generic definition of the term that appears in the removal ground with which we are concerned. Federal court or Board of Immigration Appeals case law may define a general term; checking secondary sources can save research time. Some removal grounds reference a federal statute as the definition, in which case we look to federal cases interpreting that statute. The Supreme Court reviewed possible sources for definitions, including the Model Penal Code, common law, and the law of several states, and finally decided that generic burglary contains these elements: “an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.” The Court found that the term “building or other structure” does not include a vehicle. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990) (emphasis added). Note on subsequent expansion of the definition of burglary. Almost thirty years after Taylor, the Supreme Court revisited this generic definition and held that it includes burglary of a vehicle that is “adapted or customarily used for lodging.” United States v. Stitt, 139 S.Ct. 399 (2018). The Court reviewed its prior decisions on burglary, in Taylor, Mathis, etc., and found that that particular issue had not been presented, and the prior decisions did not conflict with it. Because the new definition does not affect those prior decisions, we will not discuss it further as part of this example. Identify the minimum conduct prosecuted that violates the statute of conviction Using the text of the statute of conviction, state case law, or other materials, we identify the minimum conduct required to violate the statute of which our client was convicted. Court decisions may refer to this as the “minimum conduct,” “least acts criminalized,” or “least adjudicated elements.” Remember that we are focusing solely on the minimum conduct that can be or has been prosecuted under the statute, and “ignoring the particular facts of the case.” Mathis, 136 S.Ct. at 2248. The Supreme Court has cautioned that an immigrant may not simply imagine some theoretical, possible minimum conduct for an offense, but must demonstrate a “realistic probability” that this minimum conduct actually would be prosecuted under the statute. One may prove this by producing one or more cases where someone was found guilty under the statute for committing the particular minimum conduct. One can cite to published or unpublished decisions, their own case, or arguably other materials such as documents from criminal prosecutions or press releases or newspaper articles, that document conviction for non-generic conduct. For further discussion of the realistic probability of prosecution, see Part II, below, and see online practice advisories. One excellent source of information about a state statute’s minimum conduct is the relevant state jury instruction for the offense. Do an internet search, or work with a criminal defense attorney, to find the instructions. The instructions also may cite to state precedential cases, which are the best authority. In addition to cases, many circuit courts of appeals have held that an immigrant can demonstrate that a statute is overbroad if the express language of the statute includes conduct that is outside of the generic federal definition. In circuits that have adopted this rule, sometimes referred to as the “express language rule,” no cases or other realistic probability proof is necessary. The BIA and just a few circuit courts of appeals have declined to adopt the express language rule. See Part II, below. In those jurisdictions, even if the statute describes a specific minimum conduct, the immigrant may need to provide a further showing of realistic probability of prosecution. Is the crime of conviction defined more broadly than the generic definition? Here is where we compare the elements of the generic definition with the elements of the client’s conviction. If the generic definition contains all of the elements of the criminal statute, there is a categorical match. Another way to state the test is to say that if there is some way to commit the state offense that would not also commit the generic definition, then there is no categorical match. If there is a categorical match, the removal ground will apply to every conviction under the statute. The client loses and our analysis is over. If there is no categorical match, then the statute as whole is overbroad, meaning it reaches conduct not reached by the generic definition. In that case the immigrant will win everything, unless the statute is divisible. We go to Step 2 to determine divisibility. STEP 2 Is the Criminal Statute Divisible? This step may appear complex, but stay with it until the example. In Mathis, the Supreme Court affirmed a strict test for when a criminal statute is divisible. The statute must meet all of these criteria: The jury unanimity requirement is a new concept to many immigration advocates, and state law is not always clear as to whether statutory alternatives are means (no juror unanimity requirement) or elements (juror unanimity requirement). In Mathis, the Supreme Court provided instructions on how to determine whether these statutory phrases are elements or means. The Court identified the following sources (see Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256-2257): State case law. As was the case in Mathis, sometimes there are state cases that rule on whether statutory alternatives have a juror unanimity requirement. You can find these cases through ordinary state law research tools. State model criminal jury instructions, often available on state court system websites, may provide case citations that speak to the juror unanimity question, and thus can be a good place to start research. However, in
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