An in absentia order is an order that is entered by the Judge in your absence (in absentia). If you are not present in Court the Judge may enter an order against you if she believes that you were given proper notice of the hearing and should have been there. If this happens you can file a motion to reopen the case. Typically such a motion much be filed within 180 days according to the regulations but there is an exception if it was an in absentia order and the reason you were not there was because you did not receive notice of the hearing i.e. no one informed you that you had a hearing that day. If you missed your hearing and you are trying to file a motion to reopen pro se (without a lawyer) then you should read this article about filing a motion to reopen pro se and take a look at the EOIR template MTRO for non-represented respondents. You should also read the blog post, What if I Missed my Hearing and Was Ordered Removed. This article contains the Regulations, Statutes, Court Rules, and Case Law relating to Motions to Reopen In Absentia Orders. REGULATIONS 8 CFR § 1003.23 8 CFR § 1003.23 – Reopening or reconsideration before the immigration court 8 CFR §1003.23(b)(4)(iii) (iii) Order entered in absentia in deportation or exclusion proceedings. (A) An order entered in absentia in deportation proceedings may be rescinded only upon a motion to reopen filed: (1) Within 180 days after the date of the order of deportation if the alien demonstrates that the failure to appear was because of exceptional circumstances beyond the control of the alien (e.g., serious illness of the alien or serious illness or death of an immediate relative of the alien, but not including less compelling circumstances); or (2) At any time if the alien demonstrates that he or she did not receive notice or if the alien demonstrates that he or she was in federal or state custody and the failure to appear was through no fault of the alien. STATUTES 8 U.S.C. §1229a(b)(5)(C)(i) In absentia removal order may be rescinded upon a motion to reopen if the noncitizen demonstrates that the failure to appear at the removal hearing was because of “exceptional circumstances.” 8 U.S.C. §1229a(b)(5)(C)(i). That term refers to circumstances beyond the noncitizen’s control, such as “serious illness or death” of the noncitizen’s spouse, child, or parent, but does not include “less compelling circumstances.” 8 U.S.C. §1229a(e)(1). The panel explained that, in making the exceptional circumstances determination, the IJ and BIA must look to the totality of the circumstances and must consider certain relevant factors. INA §240(e)(1) INA §240(e)(1) Exceptional Circumstances beyond the alien’s control INA §240(b)(5)(C)(ii) INA §240(b)(5)(C)(ii) Lack of Notice EOIR Practice Manual https://www.justice.gov/eoir/reference-materials/ic/chapter-5/9 (a) In General — A motion to reopen requesting that an in absentia order be rescinded asks the immigration judge to consider the reasons why the respondent did not appear at the respondent’s scheduled hearing.  See Chapter 4.17 (In Absentia Hearing). … **(1) Content — A motion to reopen to rescind an in absentia order must demonstrate that: the failure to appear was because of exceptional circumstances; the failure to appear was because the respondent did not receive proper notice; or the failure to appear was because the respondent was in federal or state custody and the failure to appear was through no fault of the respondent. INA § 240(b)(5)(C), 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii).  The term “exceptional circumstances” refers to exceptional circumstances beyond the control of the respondent (such as battery or extreme cruelty to the respondent or any child or parent of the respondent, serious illness of the respondent or serious illness or death of the spouse, child, or parent of the respondent, but not including less compelling circumstances).  INA § 240(e)(1). **(2) Time limits — (A) Within 180 days — If the motion to reopen to rescind an in absentia order is based on an allegation that the failure to appear was because of exceptional circumstances, the motion must be filed within 180 days after the in absentia order.  See INA § 240(b)(5)(C), 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii). (B) At any time — If the motion to reopen to rescind an in absentia order is based on an allegation that the respondent did not receive proper notice of the hearing, or that the respondent was in federal or state custody and the failure to appear was through no fault of the respondent, the motion may be filed at any time.  See INA § 240(b)(5)(C), 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii). (C) Responses — Responses to motions to reopen to rescind in absentia orders are due within ten (10) days after the motion was received by the immigration court, unless otherwise specified by the immigration judge. **(3) Number limits — The respondent is permitted to file only one motion to reopen to rescind an in absentia order.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii). **(4) Automatic stay — The removal of the respondent is automatically stayed pending disposition by the immigration judge of the motion to reopen to rescind an in absentia order in removal proceedings.  See INA § 240(b)(5)(C), 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii) BIA CASE LAW Matter of Haim, 19 I&N Dec. 641, 642 (BIA 1988) Matter of M-R-A-, 24 I&N Dec. 665 (BIA 2008) Matter of C-R-C-, 24 I&N Dec. 677 (BIA 2008). In determining whether the respondent has overcome this presumption, the immigration judge must consider both circumstantial and corroborating evidence, and may consider a variety of factors, including (but not limited) to: CIRCUIT COURT CASE LAW MONTEJO-GONZALEZ V. GARLAND, No. 21-304 (9th Cir. 2024) A mother and her two minor children, who entered the United States seeking asylum, were scheduled for an initial hearing before an immigration judge (IJ) in Seattle, Washington. On their way to the hearing, they encountered two major car accidents, causing them to be two hours late. Upon arrival, they attempted to have their case heard but were unsuccessful. The IJ ordered them removed in absentia. They promptly moved to reopen the case, arguing that exceptional circumstances justified their late arrival. The Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the IJ and BIA abused

Administrative Closure Administrative closure can be requested by either the government or the respondent. It may be offered by the government when they prefer not to take testimony or where there potential issued regarding whether someone should receive asylum or another form of relief. This may occur if there are issues with jurisdiction, timeliness, or other procedural matters. When administratively closed, your case technically remains “pending” with the immigration court and can be re-opened at any time by either party or the judge. The greatest benefit of administrative closure is that employment authorization remains valid and can continue to be renewed since the underlying application for relief is still pending, although there are no future hearing dates being scheduled and that application will not ever be adjudicated unless things change. When a case is administratively closed a person remains in removal proceedings. It is essentially just removing the case from the Court’s calendar so there are no more future hearing dates, but the case is still before the Court. If the respondent wants to pursue relief before USCIS they would need to dispose of the case before the Court first since jurisdiction is still vested with the Court. For the same reason the respondent cannot leave the country without “self-deporting.” DHS used to agree to administrative closure as a matter of PD more often than they do now. Dismissal is now the much preferred way of exercising PD.

Termination of Proceedings Proceedings may only be terminated when there is a legal basis for doing so. A motion to terminate asks an Immigration Judge to end the proceedings by alleging that the government’s charges are substantively or procedurally defective. The Immigration Judge’s authority to terminate proceedings are limited by regulations 8 CFR § 1003.10(b) and 8 CFR § 1003.1(d)(1)(ii), which give Courts and the BIA the power to take “any action” that is “appropriate and necessary” to dispose of a case. The Board defined the specifics of this in more detail in  in Matter of S-O-G- & F-D-B-. The AG later set the rule that controls now from Matter of S-O-G-. In Matter of S-O-G, the AG held that Immigration Judges, “have no inherent authority to terminate or dismiss removal proceedings” even if a case presents compelling circumstances, restricting Immigration Judge’s discretion to terminate. However, the decision also held that the IJ can terminate proceedings if it is expressly authorized by (1) 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f), where a respondent is eligible for naturalization, has a pending naturalization application, and has exceptionally appealing or humanitarian factors in their case, and (2) under 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(c) where DHS moves to dismiss a notice to appear. This decision, however, does not affect motions to terminate that are grounded in law. An Immigration Judge continues to maintain the authority to terminate for any nondiscretionary basis supported by the BIA or judicial decisions, for example lack of subject matter discretion, improperly served NTA, regulatory violations, or res judicata. Termination is like dismissal in that is completely ends the removal proceedings. Any applications before the Court are no longer pending and nothing further must be done to pursue another immigration benefit through other means. Termination can be with or without prejudice. If with prejudice then the respondent cannot be put into removal proceedings again for the same reasons in that first Notice to Appear.